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In this paper we prove a perhaps unexpected relationship between
the complexity class of the boolean functions that have linear size
circuits and n-party private protocols. Specifically, let f be a boolean
function. We show that f has a linear size circuit if and only if f has a
1-private n-party protocol in which the total number of random bits
used by all players is constant. From the point of view of complexity
theory, our result gives a characterization of the class of linear size
circuits in terms of another class of a very different nature. From the
point of view of privacy, this result provides 1-private protocols that use
a constant number of random bits, for many important functions for
which no such protocol was previously known. On the other hand, our
result suggests that proving, for any NP function, that it has no 1-private
constant-random protocol, might be difficult. ] 1999 Academic Press
1. INTRODUCTION
Proving lower bounds on circuit size is one of the central
goals of complexity theory. While Shannon proved that
almost all functions require exponential size circuits [19],
no such lower bound for any NP function is known today.
The best lower bounds on unrestricted circuits1 are linear
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(e.g., [3, 18, 21]). In other words, no NP function f that
cannot be computed by a linear size circuit is currently
known (the reader is referred to the survey of Boppana
and Sipser [4] for an exposition on the current state of
knowledge in circuit complexity and for an extensive list of
references). A major goal is therefore to improve our under-
standing of the class of linear size circuits. In particular, a
characterization of this class in terms of a different class of
objects is desirable.
Private protocols allow n players in a distributed system,
each holding a single input bit xi , to compute a boolean
function f (x1 , ..., xn) correctly and 1-privately; that is, in a
way that no single player gets any additional information
about the inputs of other players.2 Privacy was the subject
of a considerable amount of work, e.g., [1, 2, 5, 813,
15, 16]. Recently, the amount of randomness required by
private protocols was studied [6, 14, 17]; a protocol is said
to be d-random if the maximum, over all inputs and
executions, of the total number of random bits tossed by all
players, is at most d.
In this paper we relate linear size circuits and private
protocols. We prove that for every boolean function f the
following holds:
f has a linear size circuit
if and only if
f has 1-private O(1)-random protocol.
2 This is a special case of t-privacy discussed in the literature, where
coalitions of at most t players are considered (and both the inputs and the
output are not restricted to single bits).9 0022-000099 30.00
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OFrom the point of view of privacy, this result gives 1-private
O(1)-random protocols for many important functions such
as and or majority (while such protocols were previously
known only for the function xor and degenerate functions
that depend only on small number of variables). On the
other hand, the result suggests that proving, for any NP
function, that it has no 1-private O(1)-random protocol
might be quite difficult. From the point of view of complexity
theory, our result gives a characterization of the important
class of linear size circuits in terms of another class of a very
different nature. In principle, it might be the case that
privacy arguments could be used for proving lower bounds
on circuit sizes.
We emphasize that none of the directions of this theorem
is straightforward. For one direction we show how to
simulate a circuit by a private protocol. While this line of
proof is common to most positive results in privacy (e.g.,
[5, 8, 13]), our construction is very efficient in randomness:
We use only a constant number of random bits, reusing
them over and over again. Previous constructions essentially
use new random bits for almost each gate of the circuit.3 The
second direction is even more interesting. It shows how to
transform 1-private O(1)-random protocols into linear
size circuits. We remark that this transformation is independ-
ent of the computational complexity or the communication
complexity of the protocol.
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1. Circuits
We consider circuits having as input n bits x1 , ..., xn , and
their negations x 1 , ..., x n . A circuit consists of and and or
gates of fan-in 2, and arbitrary fan-out. The size of a circuit,
denoted mg , is the number of gates in the circuit. (Alter-
natively, one can consider the measure me , the size of the
circuit in edges. Note that these two measures are essentially
the same: mgme2mg .)
For a function f : [0, 1]*  [0, 1] denote by fn the
restriction of f to the domain [0, 1]n. A function f : [0, 1]* 
[0, 1] is in the class of linear size circuits if there is a constant
k such that for all n there exists a circuit of size at most k } n
that computes the restricted function fn . If f is in this class
we say that f has a linear size circuit.
Remark. Many variants of this definition are equivalent.
For example, we could allow different types of gates with
constant fan-in c. We could allow negations to appear in
any place in the circuit, etc. The circuit size under all these
variants is the same if we ignore constant factors.
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3 All these constructions were described in the more general t-private
setting. However, even simplifying these constructions to the 1-privacy case
requires new random bits for almost every gate. In fact, the secret sharing
stage, with which all these constructions start, already uses a total of n log n
random bits, even in its 1-private version.2.2. Private Protocols
We give a description of the protocols we consider and
define the privacy property of protocols. We use here the
private channels model (as in [5, 8]) in which information
theoretic privacy is considered, as opposed to computa-
tional privacy (as in [13, 20]).
Let fn : [0, 1]n  [0, 1] be a boolean function. A set of n
players Pi (1in), each player Pi possessing a single
input bit xi (known only to Pi), collaborate in a protocol to
compute the value of fn(x). Each player Pi is provided with
a (read only) random tape Ri , each of its bits is uniformly
distributed and the bits are all independent. The protocol
operates in rounds. In each round each player may toss
some coins (that is, it reads some random bits from its
random tape), and then sends messages to the other players
(messages are sent over private channels so that other than
the intended receiver no other player can listen to them).
The player then receives the messages sent to it by the other
players. In addition, each player at a certain round chooses
to output the value of the function.
Each player Pi receives during the execution of the proto-
col a sequence of messages. Let ci be a random variable of
the communication string received by player Pi , and let C i
be a particular communication string received by Pi . Infor-
mally, privacy with respect to player Pi means that player Pi
cannot learn anything (in particular, the inputs of the other
players) from Ci , except what is implied by its input bit, and
the value of the function computed. Formally,
Definition 1 (Privacy). An n-party protocol A for
computing a function fn is private with respect to player Pi
if for any two input vectors x and y, such that fn(x)= fn(y)
and xi= yi for any sequence of messages Ci , and for any
random tape Ri provided to Pi ,
Pr[ci=Ci | Ri , x]=Pr[ci=Ci | Ri , y],
where the probability is over the random tapes of all other
players. A protocol A is 1-private (or private, for short) if
it is private with respect to every player P i . A function fn is
1-private (or private, for short) if there exists a 1-private
protocol A that computes the function fn .
The number of coin tosses done (or the amount of random-
ness used) by player Pi is defined as the position of the
rightmost bit read from its random tape Ri . To measure the
amount of randomness used by a protocolwe give the following
definition.
Definition 2 (Randomness). A d-random protocol is a
protocol such that for any input assignment, the total
VSKY, AND ROSE Nnumber of coins tossed by all players in any execution is at
most d. We say that a function f : [0, 1]*  [0, 1] has a
1-private O(1)-random protocol if there exists a constant d
Nsuch that for all n there exists a d-random 1-private protocol
that computes fn : [0, 1]n  [0, 1].
We emphasize that the definitions allow, for example, that
in different executions different players will toss the coins.
This may depend on both the input of the players, and the
outcome of previous coin tosses.
3. MAIN THEOREM
Our main result in this paper is the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let f be a boolean function. The function
f has a linear size circuit if and only if f has a 1-private
O(1)-random protocol.
The theorem follows immediately from the following two,
more general, lemmas that we prove. The first lemma shows
how to construct, from a circuit of size ; } n, a 1-private
O(;)-random protocol. (The proof of this lemma appears in
Section 4.)
Lemma 2. If fn can be computed using a circuit of size mg ,
then fn can be computed using a 1-private O(mg n)-random
protocol.
For the second direction, from a 1-private d-random
protocol, we construct a circuit of size ; } n where ; is expo-
nential in d. (The proof of this lemma appears in Section 5.)
Lemma 3. If fn can be computed using a 1-private d-random
protocol, then fn can be computed using a circuit of size 2O(d) } n.
4. FROM CIRCUITS TO PROTOCOLS
(PROOF OF LEMMA 2)
As is done in (almost) all known private protocols, given
a circuit (with mg gates) that computes a function fn , the
players simulate the circuit in a gate-by-gate manner (from
bottom to top). As opposed to most other constructions of
private protocols, in our simulation different players have
different roles.4 First, we partition the players into two sets:
21=[P1 , ..., Pwn2x]
and
22=[Pwn2x+1 , ..., Pn].
We call the players in 22 the input players. The players in 21
are further partitioned as follows:
CHARACTERIZING LIv The player P1 , which is called the randomness player.
4 One exception for this is in [20], where there are two players who play
nonsymmetric roles.v k=w( |21 |&1)3xrn6 teams, each consists of three
players. Every i th team, Ti , is further partitioned into a set
of two in-players, denoted Ai and Bi , and the third player,
the out-player, denoted Ci .
We first give a high-level description of the simulation:
Each input player Pi # 22 , will be responsible during the
simulation for its own input bit xi (and its negation) and
also for the bit x i&wn2x (and its negation) which is an input
of a player in 21 (if n is odd then player Pn is responsible
only for its own input). To do that, player Pi will receive
a message from Pi&wn2x which will consist of the value
xi&wn2x xored with a random bit. Thus the privacy require-
ment with respect to Pi will still hold. Each of the k teams
will be responsible for the simulation of (at most) l=
Wmg kX gates. When a team Ti simulates a gate g, the two
in-players Ai and Bi will be responsible for the (two) inputs
of the gate while the out-player Ci will be responsible for the
output of the gate. Again, to guarantee the privacy require-
ment with respect to these players, both the inputs and the
output of the gate will be xored with random bits in a way
that will be described below. Note that each of the inputs for
the gate g is either an output of a gate g$ which was already
simulated by some team Tj , or one of the 2n inputs of the
circuit. In the former case, the corresponding in-player of Ti
(i.e., Ai or Bi) will get a message from the out-player Cj of
the team Tj that simulated g$. In the latter case, the corre-
sponding in-player of Ti will receive a message from the
relevant input player (in 22). The simulation itself consists
of the exchange of a number of messages between the players
of the team Ti (and the randomness player P1), which
results in the out-player Ci having a bit which is the value
of the gate g xored with a random bit.
All the random bits required in the protocol are chosen
by the randomness-player, P1 . These bits are logically
partitioned as follows:
v r0used to mask the inputs of players in 21 when sent
to the corresponding players in 22 .
v r1 , ..., rl used to mask the inputs of the gates before
sending them to the in-players (guarantees the privacy with
respect to the in-players).
v s1 , ..., sl used to mask the outputs of the gates at the
out-players (guarantees the privacy with respect to the
out-players).
v : } l random bits used for the simulation of the gates
(:=10). Every team uses : independent random bits for
each of the l simulations that it performs. However, different
teams use the same random bits.
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random bits used is O(l)=O(mgn). The protocol works as
follows.
OProtocol.
1. (Coin Tossing). P1 tosses all the coins described
above. It sends r0 to all players in 21 . It sends r1 , ..., rl to all
input players (i.e., 22) and to all out-players (i.e., the Ci ’s).
It sends the :l random bits needed for the simulation to the
in-players (i.e., the Ai ’s and Bi ’s).
2. (Inputs Transfer). Each player Pi # 21 sends a bit
yi=xi r0 to Pi+wn2x .
3. (Simulation.) The gates of the circuits are partitioned
into l sets each of size at most k. Each of the k teams of
players is responsible for (at most) one gate in each of the
l sets. The assignment of teams to gates, and the role of each
player in each team is fixed and known to all players. The
simulation of the circuit goes in a bottom-up manner, each
gate g being simulated by a team Ti only after all gates
below it (in the circuit) have been simulated. The result of
gate g being simulated is that the out-player of team Ti
holds a value which is the value of the gate xored with one
of the random bits [sj]. In what follows we describe how
team Ti simulates a gate g that falls in the d th set of gates.
For a given input x, denote by a and b the inputs of gate g
in the original circuit, and by c its output. The players do the
following:
(a) Ai gets a value which corresponds to the input a:
If a is an output of some previous gate, then
there is an out-player Cj that holds this value a
xored with some bit sd $ . Player Cj sends to A i the
value (asd $)rd .
If a is some variable xj , for jwn2x+1, then
Pj sends to Ai the value xj rd .
If a is x j for jwn2x+1 then P j sends to Ai the
value x j rd .
If a is xj for jwn2x then Pj+wn2x sends to Ai
the value yj rd=(x j r0)rd .
If a is x j for jwn2x then Pj+wn2x sends to Ai
the value yj 1rd=(x j r0)rd .
Note that in all cases the message that Ai gets
can be represented as a ja rd , where a is the
input value to the gate in the original circuit, and
the bit ja is either the constant 0 or some random
value independent of r1 , ..., rl .
(b) In the same way Bi gets a value that corresponds
to b (represented as b jb rd).
(c) Players Ai , Bi , Ci and P1 evaluate the gate g. This
evaluation consists of each of Ai , Bi and P1 sending
a single message to Ci who will be able to compute
the value csd . A detailed description of this
132 KUSHILEVITZ, OSTRprocess is given later in the sequel.
4. (Output). The out-player Cj of the team that com-
putes the final output gate of the circuit, sends the value itcomputes, which is fn(x)sd $ , to P1 . Player P1 then xors
this message with the random bit sd $ (which is known to it)
to get the desired output fn(x), and broadcasts the output to
all other players.
Although we have postponed the description of Stage
(3c) of the simulation, we have described already, for all
but the out-players, all the messages that they receive.
Therefore, we can already show the following properties of
the protocol:
1. Player P1 , although taking a very active role in the
protocol, gets only a single message which is fn(x)sd $ (in
the Output stage). Thus, given the value of the function fn(x)
and the random bits (chosen by P1) this message is fixed.
The privacy requirement with respect to P1 thus holds.
2. The communication sent to each player Pj in 22
consists of a sequence of random bits r1 , ..., rl (sent to Pj in
the Coin Tossing stage), the bit yj&wn2x=x j&wn2x r0
(sent to Pj in the Inputs Transfer stage), and the value of the
function (as broadcast in the Output stage).5 That is, given
any input assignment x, the last message is fixed by fn(x),
and for the previous l+1 messages, each of the possible
sequences of messages w1 , ..., wl+1 (for wi # [0, 1]) has
probability 2&(l+1) (since r0 , r1 , ..., rl are all independent
and uniformly distributed). Thus the privacy requirement
with respect to the players in 22 holds.
3. To claim the privacy with respect to the in-players,
note that the sequence of messages received by each in-
player Pj consists of :l random bits, followed by a sequence
of l$l single bit messages (one bit for each of the gates
that the player simulates), followed by a message which is
the value of the function. The sequence of l$ messages that
correspond to the simulated gates is of the form a$1 r1 , ...,
a$l$ rl$ , where a$i is an input value to some gate (in the
original circuit), xored with a bit ji which is independent of
the bits r1 , ..., rl , and of the :l random bits communicated
to the in-player earlier. Therefore, given any input assignment
x, the output message is fixed by fn(x), and the probability
of each possible communication sequence for the previous
:l+l$ messages is 2&(:l+l$). This implies the privacy
requirement with respect to each of the in-players.
We can conclude the above with the following claim.
Claim 1. The protocol described above computes the
function fn correctly, is O(mg n)-random, and is 1-private
with respect to the random player P1 , the players in 22 , and
VSKY, AND ROSE Nthe in-players.
5 If n is odd then player Pn does not get a y message in the Inputs Transfer
stage.
NThe only players for which the privacy is not claimed yet
are the out-players. For this, we first need to describe how
the actual computation is done and which messages the
out-players receive (in Stage (3c) of the Simulation stage).
We remark that there are several ways of doing this compu-
tation, based on various private protocols in the literature.
The one we use here is based on ideas from [11].
v Stage (3C). Recall that player Ai has some value
a$=a ja rd , player Bi has some value b$=b jb rd
and the goal is for out-player Ci to have the value
c$=csd , where c is the output of the gate on the inputs a
and b. Obviously, P1 does not know a and b (this may
violate the privacy), however it knows all the random bits.
Thus, using the actual values of the random bits, P1 can
prepare a 2_2 matrix Z such that each of its rows corre-
sponds to a possible value of a$, each column corresponds to
a possible value of b$, and each (a$, b$) entry of the matrix
contains the corresponding value c$. Now Ai , Bi , and P1 use
:=10 random bits for their messages (these : bits are
already known to all three of them). These : bits are viewed
as two 2_2 boolean matrices ZA and ZB and two additional
bits kA and kB . Player P1 uses the random bit kA to permute
the rows of Z (i.e., if kA=0 it does nothing and if kA=1 it
switches the rows) and uses kB to permute the columns of Z.
Denote by Z$ the resulted matrix. P1 now computes a 2_2
matrix Z*=Z$ZAZB. Player P1 then sends Z* to Ci .
Player Ai knows a$ and it also knows kA (received from P1
in the Coin Tossing stage) so it knows the row a*=a$kA
of Z* which contains the value c$. It sends this index to Ci
(since kA is random this index gives no information on a$)
and also ZAa* , the corresponding row of Z
A (these are just
two random bits). Similarly, Bi knows b$ and it also knows
kB so it knows the column b*=b$kB of Z* which contains
the value c$. It sends this index to Ci and also ZBb* , the corre-
sponding column of ZB. Player Ci uses the row ZAa* it got
from Ai and the column ZBb* it got from Bi to ‘‘reveal’’ the
(a*, b*) entry of Z* and to get c$ as needed (note that for
all other entries of Z player Ci misses some of the random
bits either from ZA or ZB and, hence, has no information on
these entries; it follows that Ci gets no information other
than c$=csd).
To formally prove the privacy property with respect to
the out-player Ci , we proceed as follows. The output of each
such simulation is c$=csd . Since sd is uniformly distri-
buted then so is c$ and, hence, the output gives no information
on the input x. Now, fix the value c$ and fix in addition
values for a$, b$, and Z$. For each such choice we claim that
every communication seen by Ci , which is consistent with
the value of c$, has the same probability. More precisely,
CHARACTERIZING LInote that the communication seen by Ci consists of 10 bits
Z*, a*, b*, ZAa* , and Z
B
b* . Out of the 2
10 possible values 29
are consistent with c$. We claim that each of them appearswith probability exactly 2&9. To see this, note that each of
ZAa* and Z
B
b* is just a pair of random bits. The value a* is
the xor of a$ with a random bit, kA ; hence, it is uniformly
distributed and so is b*. Finally note that in Z* one bit is
determined by the other values and the value of c$ but since
ZA and ZB are random matrices then each of the other three
entries of Z* is uniformly distributed. This implies the privacy
with respect to a single simulation. Finally, note that in all
l simulations in which Ci participates : independent random
bits are used, and also that s1 , ..., sl are all independent.
This implies the privacy with respect to the out-players and
concludes our construction.
We thus showed the following claim, which together with
Claim 1 implies Lemma 2.
Claim 2. The protocol described is 1-private with respect
to the out-players.
5. FROM PROTOCOLS TO CIRCUITS
(PROOF OF LEMMA 3)
In what follows we make a series of transformations from
a 1-private protocol which computes a function fn using d
random bits until we get a circuit that computes the
function fn . First, we want all messages in the protocol to be
single bits. Any protocol can be made to satisfy this condi-
tion by ‘‘breaking’’ each of the original messages into its binary
representation.6 Henceforth, when we refer to messages, we
refer to these binary messages.
The next step relies on the following lemma from [17].
This lemma says that the number of different communi-
cation strings that a player may see in a protocol which is
1-private and uses a ‘‘small’’ amount of randomness is
‘‘small.’’ This will be a key fact for our transformation. More
precisely, we restrict our attention to a specific deterministic
protocol derived from the original protocol by fixing specific
random tapes R 1 , ..., R n for the n players (in such a deter-
ministic protocol the communication is a function of the
input assignment x only) and we give an upper bound on
the number of communication strings that can be seen by
every player Pi in such a deterministic protocol.
Lemma 4. Consider a private d-random protocol A to
compute a boolean function fn . Let Ci (x, R1 , ..., Rn)
denote the communication seen by player Pi on input x, when
the n random tapes for the players are R1 , ..., Rn . Fix the
random tapes of the n players to some R 1 , ..., R n . Then, for
any Pi , the communication Ci (y, R 1 , ..., R n) can assume at
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6 Formally, let M be the set of all different messages that can be sent in
the protocol in all different runs. Fix an arbitrary fixed-length binary
encoding for the messages in M (note that M is finite). We consider a
protocol where each player sends instead of a single message m # M, a
sequence of boolean messages that represent the binary encoding of m.
Omost 2d+2 different values (over all choices of input assignments
y # [0, 1]n).
Proof. In the first step of the proof, we fix an arbitrary
input x and consider the possible values of Ci (x, R1 , ..., Rn)
over all different choices of random tapes R1 , ..., Rn . The
d-randomness of the protocol implies that the total number
of coins tossed is at most d; however, in different execu-
tions these coins can be tossed by different players.
Nevertheless, we claim that the number of different values
that Ci (x, R1 , ..., Rn) can assume is at most 2d. For each
execution we can order the coin tosses of all players (i.e., the
readings from the local random tapes) according to the
rounds of the protocol and within each round according to
the index of the players that toss them. The identity of the
player to toss the first coin is fixed by x. The identity of
the player to toss any next coin is determined by x, and the
outcome of the previous coins. Therefore, the different
executions on input x can be described using the following
binary tree: In each node of the tree we have a name of a
player Pj that tosses a coin. The two outgoing edges from
this node, labeled 0 and 1, according to the outcome of the
coin, lead to two nodes labeled Pk and Pl , respectively
( j, k, and l need not be distinct) which are the identities of
the players to toss the next coin, depending on the outcome of
the random choice made by Pj . If no additional coin toss
occurs, the node is labeled ‘‘nil’’; there are no outgoing edges
from a nil node. By the d-randomness property of the protocol,
the depth of the above tree is at most d; hence, it has at most
2d root-to-leaf paths. Every possible run of the protocol is
described by one root-to-leaf path. Such a path determines
all the messages sent in the protocol, which player tosses
coins and when, and the outcome of these coins. In particular
each such path determines for any Pi the communication
Ci (x, R1 , ..., Rn). Hence, Ci (x, R1 , ..., Rn) can assume at
most 2d different values.
In the second step of the proof, we first fix a vector of
random tapes for the players R 1 , ..., R n . We now consider
the deterministic protocol A$ derived from the private
protocol A by fixing these random tapes. We partition the
input assignments x into four groups according to the value
of xi (0 or 1), and the value of fn(x) (0 or 1). We argue that
the number of different values that the communication string
Ci (y, R 1 , ..., R n) can assume in A$, on the different input
assignments within each such group, is at most 2d. For this,
fix x in one of these four groups and consider any other y
pertaining to the same group. If the value of Ci (y, R 1 , ..., R n)
is some communication Ci , then by the privacy requirement
(with respect to player Pi), communication Ci must also
occur (in A) when the input is x, and the random tapes
are some R$1 , ..., R$n , where R$i=R i . Thus, the value of
134 KUSHILEVITZ, OSTRCi (y, R 1 , ..., R n) must also appear as Ci (x, R1 , ..., Rn)
for some random tapes R1 , ..., Rn . However, by the first
step of the proof, for a fixed x, the communication stringCi (x, R1 , ..., Rn) can assume at most 2d values (over the
random tapes R1 , ..., Rn). K
We now use the above lemma. Given a d-random private
protocol A, we can transform it into a deterministic proto-
col A$ in which each player can see (over all 2n inputs) at
most t=2d+2 different communication strings. This is done
by fixing the random tapes of all players (e.g., to the strings
of 0’s) and letting the players simulate the protocol A using
these random tapes (i.e., whenever in A a player tosses a
random coin, in A$ the player behaves as if this bit is 0). By
Lemma 4, protocol A$ is a deterministic protocol in which
each player can see at most t different communication
strings. In addition, A$ is a correct protocol to compute fn
since A$ generates a possible run of the (correct) protocol
A. Note that A$ is not a private protocol and that all the
other transformations presented below do not depend on
privacy.
The next transformation converts A$ into another (deter-
ministic) protocol A" in which we limit the total number of
messages transmitted. Although in A$ the number of different
possible communication strings of each player is restricted
to t, it might be that the number of bits that the player
receives is much larger. In A" the number of bits received by
each player will be bounded by t&1 bits.7 The intuition is
that if there are more than t&1 bits that a player receives,
then many of these bits are induced by other bits and, hence,
can be omitted (we have to make sure, however, that this
omission still enables each player to compute in time the
messages it has to send). We associate a tree with the bits
received by a player Pi . Level (k, j) of this tree corresponds
to the kth bit that player Pj sends to Pi (and the levels
appear from top to bottom in a lexicographic order). We
look at each node in level (k, j) and the path leading to it
and we put an outgoing edge with value 0 (respectively 1) if
there is an input assignment which will cause player Pi to
see the previous bits with values as indicated by the path
leading to this node and for which the k th bit that player Pj
sends to Pi is 0 (respectively 1). Observe that the root-to-
leaves paths of this tree correspond to the (at most) t commu-
nication strings that Pi may see. Thus, there are at most t
leaves in this tree, and hence, the tree contains at most t&1
nodes with out-degree 2. If there is such a node in level
(k, j), then in A" player Pj will keep sending to Pi the k th
bit as in A$; otherwise, we omit this bit from A". Since the
total number of such nodes is at most t&1, then in A" player
Pi will receive at most t&1 bits. All the bits that Pi receives
in nodes with out-degree 1 are fixed by previous messages,
and hence, Pi can deduce their value without actually
receiving the bits. Player Pi can therefore compute any
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7 Ideally, one could hope for each player P i to receive only log2 t bits;
this, however, may not be possible since messages are sent to Pi by various
senders which may have only partial information about the communica-
tion exchanged by other players.
Nmessage it has to send by simulating A$. Thus, for all Pi ’s
the protocol A" is well defined. Note that the protocol A"
is oblivious; that is, the senders, the receivers, and the rounds
in which messages are sent are independent of the input.
Our last stage is to transform A" into a circuit. We will
consider the messages sent in protocol A" and add to those
a single ‘‘virtual output message’’ which will be the value of
the function computed. To do that we pick an arbitrary
player Pi and define the additional message as the value of
the function as computed by this player locally. As each
player receives at most t&1 bits, altogether (including the
output message) at most n } (t&1)+1 bits are exchanged
(this does not mean that each player sends at most t&1
bits). To build the circuit we employ a simple idea: The
circuit is built out of subcircuits, each computing one of the
messages. Each message sent by a player Pi in A" will be
simulated by a subcircuit that gets as inputs xi (the input of
Pi), and all the (at most t&1) bits that Pi received so far
from other players. The bit to be sent by Pi is some function
g of these (at most t) bits. Clearly, using a simple construc-
tion we can implement a circuit that computes g with size
O(t } 2t), e.g., using the DNF form of g. However, this can
be improved using the following observation. As explained
above, each player can see at most t different views. There-
fore, it suffices that each subcircuit will compute meaningful
results only for these t possible views. Such a circuit can
be easily constructed to have size of O(t2) (e.g., by using a
DNF representation with a single term for each of the t
possible views on which 1 is the output). Altogether, there
are O(t } n) subcircuits of size O(t2) each, and the total size
of the circuit is O(t3n)=2O(d ) } n. The output of the circuit is
the output of the subcircuit that computes the additional
‘‘virtual output message.’’ Finally, note that the implemen-
tation of the subcircuits as described above may use nega-
tion gates (in addition to or and and gates). To get a circuit
that conforms to the definition we gave, we apply a standard
transformation to the whole circuit, so that only input
variables are negated; this transformation may result in a
penalty of a factor of 2 in the size of the circuit. This
concludes our construction for the proof of Lemma 3.
6. EXTENSIONS AND OPEN PROBLEMS
Looking at our constructions, one can see that they not
only give a relationship between the size of circuits and
the amount of randomness used by the protocol but, in
addition, they maintain the relationship between the depth
of the circuit and the number of rounds of the private
protocol. Namely, given a circuit of depth l our protocol
can operate in O(l) rounds.8 For the other direction, given
CHARACTERIZING LI8 The protocol, as defined in Section 4, operates in more rounds, but can
be easily converted to run in O(l) rounds by simulating concurrently all
the gates which are in the same level of the circuit.a d-random protocol that operates in r rounds, the circuit
that we obtain is of depth O(d ) } r.
The most obvious open problem raised by this work is to
prove, for some NP function f, that it has no 1-private
protocol that uses d=O(1) random bits. This would imply
that this function has no linear size circuit. A more modest
goal would be to prove such a lower bound for a specific
constant d. Although we know that any boolean function
can be computed privately using a randomized protocol [5,
8], as of today the only known lower bound on the amount
of randomness necessary to 1-privately compute a function
fn , is that deterministicallyalmost no function can be computed
1-privately (i.e., at least 1 random bit is necessary).
Finally, we remark that the results of the present work
(in particular, the randomness-efficient protocols) were sub-
sequently extended to deal with the more general t-privacy
case [7].
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